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Korean Peninsula Nuclear Challenges:
The Imperative of Regional Cooperative
Security Solutions1
By Wade L. Huntley (Canada)
Introduction
The Bush Administration prides itself on responding “realistically”to serious international threats. But its policies toward NorthKorea have been more responsive to some officials’ self-generated
aspirations than to actual circumstances prevailing on the Korean
Peninsula and in the East Asian region. The predilections behind the
Bush Administration’s North Korea policy reflect the deeper ideationally-
inspired world view driving much of the administration’s international
behavior. This orientation persists despite the more practical tone of the
Bush Administration’s approach to North Korea in its second term.
The administration’s continuing commitment to ideationally
informed outlooks has impeded effective response to North Korea’s
nuclear ambitions. Partly for this reason, North Korea’s nuclear
capabilities have advanced in recent years, culminating in the October
2006 nuclear test. In this context, the February 2007 agreement emerging
from the Six-Party Talks was a welcome turn back in the direction of a
nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. Now more than ever, however, achieving
that goal depends on parallel progress toward establishment of a durable
regional security regime in Northeast Asia that includes conflict
resolution mechanisms to replace reliance on nuclear threats for national
security.
1 Paper presented at: Northeast Asia Regional Steering Group Meeting Global
Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC-NEA) Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia
– May 24-25, 2007
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The US Disposition
Throughout its first term, the Bush Administration made little effort
to shape its North Korea policy on the basis of extant conditions. Instead,
it based policy fundamentally on assumptions about the Pyongyang
regime’s character. As those assumptions proved specious its North
Korea policy floundered, increasing strains with other regional
governments, including ally South Korea.2 The inability of the
administration to adapt its ineffective policy to changing circumstances
stemmed from the roots of that policy in the administration’s powerful
and inflexible predispositions concerning the extent of US power and
the rectitude of the administration’s overarching global vision.
As Pentagon strategists absorbed the implications of the end of the
Cold War, US military planning throughout the 1990s increasingly
expressed the aim of military “dominance,” and foresaw a continuing
role for US nuclear weapons in this posture. But the Bush
Administration’s policies superseded this ambition, mapping out
intentions for new strategies aspiring to put US global political “primacy”
to the service of transforming world politics in the American image.3
In its second term, the Bush Administration has reaffirmed the core
tenets of this strategy. President Bush’s second inaugural address
reiterated that “it is the policy of the United States to seek and support
the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation
and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”4 In
early 2006, the administration’s long delayed update of the National
Security Strategy emphasized this core intention even more forcefully
than its 2002 predecessor, identifying as its two foundational pillars the
2 See “Korea Backgrounder: How The South Views Its Brother From Another Planet,”
International Crisis Group Asia Report N°89, Seoul/Brussels, December 14, 2004, pp.21-
23
3 The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) map out a fundamental shift from a “threat-based” to a “capabilities-based”
approach intended to “extend America’s asymmetric advantages well into the future.”
The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) articulates these ambitions, determining to
“create a balance of power that favors human freedom” and “extend the peace by
encouraging free and open societies on every continent.” The QDR is available at http:/
/www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf>. The NPR was first publicly summarized at a
Department of Defense briefing on January 9, 2002; the classified review was subsequently
obtained by news media, and substantial excerpts are available at  http://
www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm >. The 2002 NSS is available
at  //www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/.  All links accessed December 14, 2006.
4 President George W. Bush, Inaugural Address, January 20, 2005 ://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/print/20050120-1.html
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aims of “promoting freedom, justice and human dignity” and “leading a
growing community of democracies.”5
This vision of virtuous US global leadership based on dominant
military power harkens to a nineteenth century idealist internationalism
underpinned by the security of broad oceans, and so represents the re-
ascendance of idealism over realism in shaping US grand strategy. But it
is a particular form of idealism: the active promotion of overseas
democratization, by force if necessary, pushes aside aspirations to
constitute a society among states, aiming instead to challenge the
prerogative of state sovereignty itself. President Bush’s recent
repudiation of the Yalta agreements forged at the end of World War II
evinces this viewpoint.6 The Bush Administration’s emergent grand
strategy thus represents a triumph for emancipatory militant idealism
over liberal international idealism7.
This emancipatory militant idealism drives the Bush
Administration’s approach to nuclear proliferation. The administration’s
policy documents focus less on nonproliferation than on preemptive
counter-proliferation to eliminate specific adversaries’ WMD capabilities
before they are used – or even fully realized.8 US counter-proliferation
planning includes possible nuclear weapons use, driving calls in the
Nuclear Posture Review for development of nuclear capabilities
applicable to such roles.
In this view, there is no contradiction in threatening nuclear attack
to thwart nuclear proliferation, because nuclear weapons themselves
are not really the problem; the presence of nuclear weapons in the hands
5 The 2006 National Security Strategy is available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/
nsc/nss/2006/>, accessed December 14, 2006
6 Speech by President George W. Bush, The Small Guild Hall, Riga, Latvia, May 7,
2005<http://estonia.usembassy.gov/freedom.php>.
7 For a more detailed exposition of this interpretation, see Wade L. Huntley, “Threats
All The Way Down: U.S. Nuclear Initiatives in a Unipolar World,” Review of International
Studies 32:1 (January 2006), pp 49-67. For a similar distinction between contending
strains of US foreign policy idealism, see Jonathan Monten, “The Roots of the Bush
Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy,” International
Security 29:4 (Spring 2005), pp. 112–156
8 The Bush Administration’s National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction (White House December 2002) offers only a single paragraph on the role of
“active nonproliferation diplomacy,” which simply reiterates the need for “a full range of
operational capabilities” if the efforts fail (p.4). See also National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism (White House, February 2003).
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of bad states is the problem. Hence, increased US reliance on nuclear
threats is actually part of the nonproliferation solution, and greater US
commitment to nuclear disarmament is irrelevant. This view is the
international equivalent of US conservatives’ credo opposing gun control:
guns don’t kill people; bad people with guns kill people.
Appreciating these ideational roots of the Bush Administration’s
policies elucidates its approach to North Korea. The Bush
Administration’s distaste for engaging North Korea diplomatically
expresses a deeper conviction that the current Pyongyang regime is an
international miscreant that does not deserve the prerogatives of
sovereignty. This conviction drives the administration’s tenacious
courting of “regime change” as the ultimate solution to the nuclear crisis.
Persistent anti-diplomatic rhetoric emphasizing that North Korea cannot
be “rewarded for bad behavior” evinces the posture of a parent or a
sheriff – one does not negotiate with children or outlaws.
This outlook also shapes the administration’s viewpoints on the
implications of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. North Korea’s nuclear
weapons development poses several challenges to the global
nonproliferation regime: the potential East Asian regional repercussions,
the corrosive impact on the NPT itself, and the possible proliferation of
nuclear materials and expertise. The Bush Administration’s responses
to these concerns evince its preoccupation with particular nuclear
aspirants rather than proliferation as a systemic problem per se,
expressing the ideational predispositions shaping its outlook on global
nuclear challenges.
• A steadily (if slowly) growing arsenal of nuclear weapons in North
Korea will aggravate tensions and uncertainties in East Asia. Some
worry North Korea’s actions could trigger a nuclear proliferation
“domino effect” in East Asia, and particularly might spur Japan
to obtain nuclear weapons of its own. In fact, Japan is probably
less prone to soon pursue nuclear weapons than some fear.9 But
the Bush Administration’s relative quiescence toward the prospect
that North Korea’s activities might spur Asian proliferation does
not rely on Japanese forbearance. Indeed, at one point, as the
9 In 1995 the Japanese Defense Agency compiled a 31-page secret report reaffirming
previous government studies’ conclusions that developing nuclear weapons would damage
Japan’s national and regional security interests. The existence of the report was disclosed
by the Asahi Shimbun on 20 February 2003 ://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/
japan/nuke.htm, accessed Dec. 14, 2006. Cf. Matake Kamiya, “Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron
or Coming Soon?” Washington Quarterly 26, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 63-75.
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Agreed Framework was collapsing, the administration seemed to
signal that it might view a nuclear Japan more benignly than
previous US governments.10
• North Korea is the first state ever to withdraw from the NPT.
There are no good options to mitigate the impact of its withdrawal
on the NPT itself and on the wider nonproliferation regime: either
continued North Korean non-accession or re-accession under a
unique deal would set precedents eroding current NPT compliance
norms. Yet the Bush Administration rarely expresses worries over
these kinds of impacts. On its face, the silence is striking; but given
the administration’s expressed lack of faith in both nonproliferation
and international treaties, its dispassion over diminution of the
NPT regime is hardly surprising.
• North Korea’s reinvigorated nuclear program gives it the potential
to export fissile materials, nuclear weapons development
technologies and expertise, or even completed operational
weapons. This is the consequence of a nuclear North Korea that
the Bush administration takes most seriously; preventing it has
apparently become the administration’s genuine “red line.”11 The
Bush Administration’s principal response – the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) – has gained greater legitimacy as it has
garnered more national adherents and the endorsements of the G-
8 Global Partnership and the UN Secretary General.12 But, by
design, the PSI remains disassociated with multilateral
10 Vice President Richard Cheney as stated that, in response to North Korea’s
development of nuclear weapons and missiles, “Japan may be forced to consider whether
or not they want to readdress the nuclear issues.” Asahi Shimbun, 17 March 2003, //
www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/japan/nuke.htm, accessed December 14, 2006. The
comment came in the context of considerable US discussion spurred by Charles
Krauthammer, “The Japan Card,” Washington Post, January 3, 2003
11 “N.K. Nuke Test No Red Line, Former U.S. Negotiator Says,” Chosun Ilbo, April
28,2005; David E. Sanger, “Bush Shifts Focus to Nuclear Sales by North Korea,” New
York Times, May 5, 2003
12 G8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation, Sea Island Summit 2004  ://www.g8usa.gov/
home.htm;  A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the UN Secretary
General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations, 2004,
p.45.
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nonproliferation treaty regimes that could expand its acceptance
and effectiveness.13
These responses to the several consequences of North Korea’s
nuclear weapons development stem from the Bush Administration’s lack
of faith in multilateral nonproliferation efforts generally, which itself
stems from the emancipatory militancy at the core of its “grand strategy”
for the US global posture. This viewpoint drives the administration’s
apparent reticence to abide Pyongyang as a sovereign interlocutor, and
its implicit (though often denied) conclusion that ultimately a satisfactory
settlement of the nuclear confrontation will require regime change in
North Korea. Given such a conclusion, the administration’s relative
quietude over the deleterious consequences of a nuclear North Korea
may simply express a de facto decision to minimally tolerate extant
circumstances until regime change (natural or facilitated) solves the
problem. This strategy to “contain and strain” North Korea appears to
be the last best hope of the Bush Administration’s hard-liners.
Negotiations & Consequences
Upon coming to power in early 2001, more hard-line administration
officials judged that the Clinton Administration’s engagement of North
Korea had been mere “appeasement.” These individuals were
unconcerned over the risks of a more confrontational approach to the
Agreed Framework structure that had defined the relationship of the
two countries since 1994. Indeed, some openly advocated abandoning
the Agreed Framework, charging that its terms were too lenient to North
Korea.
Bush Administration charges in October 2002 that North Korea
had developed a secret second uranium enrichment program triggered a
cascading breakdown of Agreed Framework.14 In early 2003 North
Korea restarted the Yongbyon reactor and began reprocessing the
plutonium stored at the Yongbyon site. North Korea is now believed to
have reprocessed most of the 8,000 fuel rods, yielding between 20 and
28 kg of weapons-usable plutonium. In April 2005 North Korea again
13 On this linkage see Joseph Cirincione and Joshua Williams, “Putting PSI into
Perspective,” May 3, 2005, //www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/
index.cfm?fa=view&id=16827>.
14 For a good brief overview of key events, see Jonathan D. Pollack, “The United
States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework,” Naval War College Review
56:3 (Summer 2003), esp. pp. 35-9.
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shut down the Yongbyon reactor to collect a new supply of spent fuel
which could have been reprocessed by mid-2006, providing up to 15
kilograms more of weapons-usable plutonium. Taken together, this
current stock of separated plutonium is enough for about 4 to 13 nuclear
explosive devices15.
The collapse of the Agreed Framework in 2002 created a critical
watershed. Many analyses, whether supporting greater confrontation
or greater engagement, fail to recognize that unleashing North Korea’s
plutonium-based nuclear program has shifted the status quo
fundamentally. Achieving a non-nuclear Korean peninsula now requires
rolling back an existing capacity, making a “new deal” harder to reach.
Many prior strategies to curtail North Korea’s nuclear weapons
development are not up to this qualitatively greater challenge.
This reality has become increasingly apparent – as has the inability
of the Bush administration’s ideologically-inspired confrontational
approach to cope with it. This recognition gradually enhanced the ability
of more moderate elements of the administration to steer policy toward
less bellicosity and more engagement. After the November 2004
presidential election particularly, the administration became more willing
to give North Korea assurances for its sovereignty and security and to
work closely with China and South Korea to fashion plans to address
the range of North Korea’s wider problems.
However, internal struggling over how to handle North Korea has
plagued the administration from its outset, exacerbated by the ongoing
demands of the Iraq War (both mentally and materially). Harder-line
factions have not relaxed their suppositions, and so the administration’s
engagement has been more grudging and tactical than fulsome and
principled, less a foresighted handling of the crisis than a default to a
policy of “ostrich engagement” – the continuation of “hostile neglect”
with a more benign face.16 This inclination has overshadowed the Bush
15 David Albright and Paul Brannan, “The North Korean Plutonium Stock Mid-
2006,” Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), June 26, 2006 <http://
www.isisonline. org/publications/dprk/dprkplutonium.pdf>; Robert S. Norris and Hans
M. Kristensen, “North Korea’s nuclear program, 2005,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
61:3, May/June 2005 <http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=mj05norris>.
This estimate for the number of weapons North Korea could generate from its presumed
plutonium stocks assumes North Korea 1) has only low technological capability,
equivalent to the US at the creation of its first plutonium devices, and 2) is developing a
relatively larger number of lower-yield weapons.
16 See Wade L. Huntley, see “Ostrich Engagement: The Bush Administration and the
North Korea Nuclear Crisis,” The Nonproliferation Review 11:2 (Summer 2004).
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Administration’s behavior throughout the Six-Party Talks negotiating
process.
Nevertheless, the greater influence of more moderate Bush
Administration officials in the second term enhanced US engagement of
North Korea and helped propel the negotiating process. That process
reached an apex with the joint statement of principles of September 19,
2005, articulating consensus on a set of principles addressing both goals
and means.1716 North Korea  committed itself to end efforts to produce
nuclear weapons, give up its “existing nuclear weapons,” rejoin “at an
early date” the NPT, and resubmit to IAEA safeguards, including
readmission of international inspectors to its nuclear facilities. The
agreement seemed to validate the negotiated approach to the current
Korean nuclear crisis which both North Korea and the United States
have, at various times, resisted.
From a longer-term perspective, a key provision of the agreement
was its anticipation of a broader political settlement. Both the United
States and North Korea agreed, “to respect each other’s sovereignty,
exist peacefully together and take steps to normalize their relations
subject to their respective bilateral policies.” This provision echoes similar
intentions in the 1994 Agreed Framework – lack of progress on which
may have been more disappointing in Pyongyang than delays on the
material side of the deal. The September 2005 agreement also promises
“the directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on
the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.” The Korean
Peninsula remains technically in a suspended state of war defined by the
terms of the armistice that ended the Korean War in 1953. The agreement
thus directly linked resolution of the nuclear crisis to the creation of an
overarching regional security accommodation, which could serve as an
initial stage in development of a Northeast Asian cooperative security
community.
But the agreement on principles did little to resolve trenchant
practical differences. Some of those obstacles reemerged immediately,
as widely divergent US and North Korean national statements exposed
continuing deep divisions on several issues (particularly concerning North
Korean retention of civilian nuclear facilities). Within the Bush
17 United States Department of State, “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the
Six-Party Talks Beijing, September 19, 2005" <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/
53490.htm>.
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Administration, this divisiveness enabled hard-liners to push for new
pressure tactics (including the financial sanctions that have become a
central issue of late), further dampening momentum from the agreement.
In this stalemated climate, North Korea on July 5, 2006, undertook a
series of missile tests triggering widespread alarm and a UN Security
Council condemnation; and then on October 9, 2006, test exploded a
nuclear device, bringing the situation to a new nadir and eliciting the
strongest UN Security Council action against North Korea in half a
century.
North Korea’s nuclear test marked an escalation of the crisis over
its nuclear ambitions, but not a transformation. Since the breakdown of
the Agreed Framework at the end of 2002, all of the implications of a
nuclear North Korea have been at hand. This explains why international
reaction to the test was more muted than many expected.
The US reaction to the test, relatively predictable and probably
prepared in advance, continued to emphasize the need for a diplomatic
solution while also pushing for new tighter sanctions and for creation of
an “inspections cordon” to try to seal North Korean exports of nuclear
materials and other military resources. China’s reaction, while less
predictable, was similarly balanced. China shares the goal of a non-
nuclear North Korea, for many reasons, and termed the test “brazen” –
a term usually reserved for adversaries.18 But China has interests in
Korea are broader than nuclear issue and distinct from those of the
United States. Thus, China allowed UN Security Council Resolution
1718, passed six days after the nuclear test, to invoke Chapter VII of
the UN Charter, denoting North Korea’s actions as a threat to global
peace; but China insisted the resolution refer to Chapter VII’s Article
41, not Article 42, thereby specifically ruling out the use of armed force.19
Immediately following the passage of the resolution, China’s UN
Ambassador Wang Guangya issued an extraordinary statement
seemingly rebuking the inspections cordon China had just voted to
implement:
China does not approve of the practice of inspecting cargo to
and from the DPRK. We therefore have reservations about
18 “North Korea’s Nuclear Test: The Fallout,” International Crisis Group Asia Briefing
N° 56, November 13, 2006, p.9
19 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1718, October 14, 2006  http://
daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/572/07/PDF/N0657207.pdf
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the relevant provisions of the resolution. China strongly urges
the countries concerned to adopt prudent and responsible
attitude in this regard and refrain from taking any provocative
steps that may intensify the tension.20
Thus, UN Security Council consensus veiled the ongoing
divergence of US and Chinese approaches to the issue, which constitutes
a continuing obstacle to developing the kind of cooperative regional
security environment that would enable the Six Party Talks process to
progress more dramatically.
Nevertheless, the recognition by all parties that North Korea’s
October 2006 nuclear test had not dramatically altered the situation
enabled the tactical consensus around a measured reaction to the test
that in turn supported the otherwise surprising early resumption of
progress in the Six-Party Talks. That progress produced the
implementing agreement of February 13, 2007, restoring momentum
toward the negotiated solution to Korean Peninsula nuclear conflicts
outlined in the September 2005 “Statement of Principles.”
The terms of the new agreement would shut down to research
reactor at the Yongbyon site that produces the plutonium North Korea
uses for its weapons program. In exchange, North Korea would receive
immediate shipments of fuel oil to prop up its energy-strapped economy.
Eventually North Korea would verifiably dismantle all nuclear weapons
capabilities, receiving further energy aid, release from economic sanctions
and normalization of political relations.
The deal does not replace the 1994 Agreed Framework, which
mapped a never completed course to complete denuclearization of North
Korea. Indeed, the new deal leaves recent develops – such as North
Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT and disposition of its existing
plutonium stocks – to future negotiations. In this and other practical
senses, the new agreement is considerably less precise than the Agreed
Framework.
In terms of offering a basis for building broader regional security
capacity, the new deal is also more tenuous than its predecessor. Bush
Administration principals observe that, whereas the Agreed Framework
20 “Explanatory Remarks by Ambassador Wang Guangya at the Security Council
After Taking Vote On Draft Resolution on DPRK Nuclear Test,” Permanent Mission of
the People’s Republic of China to the UN, October 14, 2006 <http://www.china-un.org/
eng/smhwj/2006/t276121.htm>.
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was mainly a bilateral accord, the new deal involves commitments by
North Korea’s key regional neighbors included in the Six Party Talks –
China, Japan, South Korea and Russia. But this is not the whole story.
Implementation of the Agreed Framework energy provisions was vested
in the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which
enlisted the active support of South Korea and Japan; its Executive Board
also included the European Union, and nine other countries joined as
members.
At the diplomatic level, the Six Party Talks is a more genuinely
multilateral process, but this too is deceptive. The Bush Administration
was to a certain extent hiding behind this multilateralism to avoid direct
negotiations with North Korea – despite support for such direct dealings
by the other four parties. Eventually the United States bent to this
necessity, meeting directly with North Korea in Berlin in January 2007,
separate from the Six Party Talks process in Beijing, in a key encounter
that set the stage for the new deal.
Thus, the new deal provides only a small step forward in fulfilling
the promise of broader regional security cooperation offered by the
September 2005 Statement of Principles. Political commitments, as well
as formal commitments, have yet to be restored even to the minimal
levels sustained under the Agreed Framework. Keeping progress toward
a broader political settlement on track is as important as seeing more
immediate practical agreements implemented forthrightly.
The Regional Security Imperative
The nuclear test has proven that achieving a non-nuclear Korean
peninsula now requires rolling back an existing capacity. Although North
Korea still has very far to go before it is a full-fledged nuclear power, no
country has ever given up a publicly demonstrated nuclear weapons
capability. The only two cases of nuclear rollback – South Africa and
the former Soviet republics – involved governments that had not
embraced nuclear weapons in their security policies. And, both those
rollbacks were triggered by dramatic regime change – an ominous
precedent for advocates of a peaceful negotiated resolution to North
Korea’s nuclear ambitions.
Today, it is clearer than ever that the only route to a peaceful
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula lies down the road of
engagement and negotiation. Misbegotten dalliances with cowboy
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confrontation have simply made that road longer and rougher. The
international community must now not only pursue rolling back North
Korea’s nuclear weapons acquisition but also take measures to prevent
a nuclear North Korea from fuelling regional security conflict and global
nuclear proliferation. Both these goals point to the need for security
cooperation among the key interested parties, particularly the United
States and China, which encompasses the full context of North Korea’s
future regional role, not merely the nuclear crisis alone.
The difficulty of these challenges underscores the importance of
the September 2005 agreement’s anticipation of reaching a wider regional
accord.
US pledges to normalize relations and provide negative security
assurances should carry great weight for a country subjected to cavalier
talk of “regime change” since the advent of the Bush Administration –
language likely reinforced in North Korea’s eyes by the US invasion of
Iraq and by inclusion of North Korea as a potential target for nuclear
counter proliferation strikes in US planning. Much would need to be
worked out over the nature and limits of US negative security guarantees.
Nevertheless, the costs of early and significant US moves toward
normalizing relations are relatively cheap compared to the potential
benefits that could accrue in smoothing negotiations over more
contentious tangible matters.
In this context, the promise offered by the six parties’ mutual
commitment to negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean
Peninsula is particularly significant. A peace treaty to end the formal
state of war would promote a wider East Asian cooperative security
regime to supplant the deterrence and balance of power dynamics now
dominating regional relations.
But this linkage is symmetric: efforts by East Asia’s principal states
to forge such broader cooperative mechanisms would reinforce the Six-
Party Talks process and bolster prospects ultimately to resolve Korea-
specific conflicts. In the new post-Agreed Framework circumstances,
easing the current Korean deadlock now also depends on progress toward
broader regional cooperation. More than ever, building enduring region-
wide cooperative security mechanisms is a prerequisite, not merely a
hoped for consequence, of peaceful achievement of a non-nuclear Korean
peninsula.
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Many analysts have long called for a “bold initiative” for dealing
with North Korea, and most reasoned proposals call for some
combination of “carrots” and “sticks.” But with the new status quo
now enabling North Korea to grow its nuclear arsenal to the limits of
its technological capabilities, anticipating broader regional security
cooperation as an outgrowth of the Six-Party Talks process is no longer
sufficient. Reversing the trajectory taking North Korea toward becoming
a full-fledged nuclear-armed state requires a “bold initiative” reaching
beyond Korea itself, setting as a forefront goal creation of a sturdy East
Asian security community.
The Bush Administration is capable of such thinking: Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld once embraced the principle, articulated
earlier by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, that “if a problem cannot
be solved, enlarge it.” James Goodby has applied this adage to the Korean
confrontation:
The nuclear issue can only be resolved within a framework
that is as large as the strategic issue of which it is a part. … In
parallel with [the six-party] talks, or independently if the talks
are not resumed, [the parties] should work out a mandate for
a permanent mechanism to promote security and cooperation
in Northeast Asia. … The mandate for a security community
should be as broad as that of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe.21
But so long as Bush Administration policy-makers sustain their
ideational preference for emancipatory militancy over multilateralism,
lasting mechanisms of regional security cooperation will be elusive. Yet
a minimalist beginning, oriented around a more realist, problem-solving
approach, is feasible, and the initial parameters of such security
cooperation are straightforward. Regarding Korea conundrums, the
United States and China could find common ground on both the
impracticality of “regime change” and the importance of an active role
for the UN Security Council, forging the Sino-American concord needed
for a lasting solution. But reaching that convergence would require the
United States and China to build a more collaborative strategic
relationship regarding Northeast Asia more broadly and to involve the
21 James Goodby, “Enlarge the North Korean problem,” International Herald Tribune,
Tuesday, June 21, 2005. C.f. Huntley, “Ostrich Engagement.”
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region’s other principal parties – constituting a “small m” multilateralism
along the lines of the early nineteenth century European “Concert of
Powers.”22
Accordingly, the aspiration to negotiate a permanent peace regime
on the Korean Peninsula should move to the forefront of attention and
aim also to establish broader security cooperation on the basis of practical
region-wide problem solving (rather than more ambitious institution-
building). Unlike with the hard details of the nuclear confrontation, non-
governmental civil society initiatives can play a vital role in nurturing
the innovative ideas and supportive climate necessary to such broader
political progress. Ongoing advocacy of Northeast Asian nuclear
weapons free zone proposals, for example, can (and should) be oriented
to contribute to this broader political goal as well as to refine and
implement the concept itself.
Conclusion
The Korean nuclear crisis has of late been a roller coaster ride – the
ascent to the September 2005 statement of principles, the plunge to the
October 2006 nuclear test, the climb back to the February 2007
implementation deal, and now the suspension in mid-air awaiting North
Korea’s shut down of the Yongbyong reactor. Stabilizing this volatility
requires addressing the wider context of the crisis. Despite the trenchant
material obstacles to resolving the Korean nuclear confrontation, the
greatest challenges are political and symbolic.
This is a major reason why future prospects are overshadowed by
the ideational predispositions the Bush Administration brings to its
engagement of this problem (not to mention the ideational blinkers of
Kim Jong-il’s regime23). The United States has the most latitude for
enterprise. But neither the passion of the Bush Administration’s
emancipatory militancy nor the ostensible sobriety of the administration’s
22 Paul Evans, “Constructing Multilateralism in an Anti-Region: From Six Party Talks
to a Regional Security Framework in Northeast Asia?,” conference on Cross Currents:
Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia, Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Centre,
Stanford University, May 11-12, 2006; revised July 8, 2006; see also David Capie and Paul
Evans, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2002), pp. 77-81
23 While this essay does not explore the ideational determinants of the policies and
strategies of Pyongyang’s government, it may be assumed these determinants are in ways
equivalent to those prevailing in the Bush Administration.
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critics is a sufficient basis for the initiative, innovation and imagination
– in a word, idealism – that building an East Asian security community
requires.
The end of the Cold War did not just terminate the superpower
nuclear arms race; it also marked a major step toward closing the great
ideological battles that have defined much of modernity. But an emerging
global consensus on the values of a rule of law, political and economic
opportunity, democracy and human security is not an “end of history.”
The defining task of the twenty-first century is to refine and articulate
this consensus in ways that reinforce rather than repress social, cultural
and religious variance, and to institutionalize this consensus through
improved global governance offering effective mechanisms for peaceful
conflict resolution. Northeast Asia today is a focal point of this global
challenge.
In justifying its stark confrontations with autocratic regimes and
its ambitions for democratization globally, Bush Administration
supporters often allude to the “democratic peace” – the finding that
democratic countries tend not to fight wars with each other. But such
interpretations of the implications of this phenomenon are at best partial.
Many in Asia, particularly in South Korea, have concluded that the
United States is avid in promoting democratic development in other
countries but loathe to accommodate divergences from US desires that
may emerge when that democratization is realized.24 Such
accommodation is a necessary concomitant of the “democratic peace”;
the Kantian conception of a federation of republican governments
premises genuine cooperation among these governments, not rote
allegiance to the strongest of them.25 This conception further appreciates
that sturdy enlightened government rises from a foundation of genuine
self-determination, not from the merely formal exercise of democratic
instruments under the shadow of foreign military occupation.
The Bush Administration is right to see a link between North Korea’s
nuclear ambitions and the broader political evolution of the region. But
this linkage does not necessitate – or justify – making “regime change”
the principal policy objective. US security policy ought to be based on a
24 Workshop Report, “America in Question: Korean Democracy and the Challenge
of Non-Proliferation on the Peninsula,” Seoul, ROK, 10-11 May 2005
25 For an expansion on this point, see Wade L. Huntley, “Kant’s Third Image: Systemic
Sources of the Liberal Peace,” International Studies Quarterly 40:1 (March 1996).
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vision for a better world. But the world deserves a voice in constituting
that vision. Improved governance within states is rarely achieved through
means that widen the divides between states. Neither a peaceful non-
nuclear solution on the Korean peninsula nor the full embrace of North
Korea within the global community of nations are achievable through
confrontation. These goals require engaging the Pyongyang regime as a
sovereign equal, while also grappling with the complex tensions involved
in East Asia’s own encounter with today’s globalizing world.
Building principled law-based global governance of this nature is
now more than ever a prerequisite to strengthening global
nonproliferation efforts. States in the world, and factions within states,
increasingly rely on nuclear threat-making for security and embrace
nuclear capabilities as symbols of power and stature. Refashioning the
conditions of global governance to break this insidious linkage between
nuclear armaments and daily politics is essential. IAEA Director General
Mohamed El Baradei makes a similar point:
Clearly, the development of a security system that does not
depend on nuclear deterrence or nuclear weapons will be a
prerequisite to a roadmap for effective disarmament. Until
the international community fully engages on the development
of such a system, achieving complete nuclear disarmament
will remain in the realm of rhetoric.26
Despite its rejection of these premises, the Bush Administration’s
generic recognition of the political dimension of nuclear proliferation is
overdue. In a more consensually developed form, this perspective can
function as an essential adjunct to the Cold War era’s narrower focus on
limiting material nuclear capabilities and upholding technical non-
discrimination. Such a broadening of perspective is vital in responding
to today’s nuclear challenges, in which abstract strategy matters less
and the broader threat-making and symbolic values of nuclear weapons
possession matter more. The ideal of eventual nuclear disarmament
requires reversing this political and symbolic linkage, which in turn
requires elevating conditions of global governance –at both national and
international levels – above the mean dictates of anarchy.
26 Mohamed ElBaradei, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Global Security in a Rapidly
Changing World,” Statement to the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference,
Washington, DC, June 21, 2004 (http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2004/
ebsp2004n004.html).
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The prerequisite is both material and normative: good governance
means good institutions, but the necessity of consensual acceptance
means good institutions cannot be imposed by fiat. Hence, the governance
goals, which are now a prerequisite to nuclear disarmament, can only
be achieved through multilateral cooperative processes building on
historic foundations of international law and transnational community.
Ad hoc self-serving unilateralism is antithetic to such outcomes.
